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GENDER EQUITY, COLLEGE SPORTS, TITLE IX AND
GROUP RIGHTS: A COACH'S VIEW'
Michael Straubelt
INTRODUCTION
Among many of my coaching colleagues the words "gender
equity" and "Title IX" have become fighting words.1 To the
coaches of male teams these words raise fears of smaller bud-
gets, team size caps (roster limits) and even the elimination of
their sports from college athletic programs.2 To the coaches of
female teams these words raise hopes of budgets as large as
01996 Michael Straubel. All Rights Reserved.
Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law;, Head Cross
Country Coach, Valparaiso University;, Assistant Track Coach, Valparaiso
University;, B.S., 1979, Western Michigan University;, J.D., 1982, Marquette
University School of Law;, LL.M., 1989, McGill University.
' In addition to teaching law for the past ten years, I have coached both the
men's and women's cross country and track teams at Valparaiso University.
Valparaiso University is a Division I member of the NCAA and the Mid-Continent
Conference. During those ten years, the issue of gender equity has caused many
"interesting" discussions.
2 Among the more visible examples are the elimination of the men's swimming
team at the University of Illinois, see Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of 1L,
832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. IlM. 1993), affld, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 938 (1995), the elimination of the wrestling team at Drake University,
see Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993), and the elimination
of the men's track team at Blinn Community College. See USA TODAY, Jan. 30,
1995, at D1. Among the less visible examples are the elimination of the men's
cross country team at Cleveland State University (at the time a member of the
Mlid-Continent Conference) and the cap of twelve team members placed on the
men's cross country team at Eastern Illinois University. And just recently a cap
was placed on team size at Brown University as part of the plan to comply with
the court order arising out of Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.RJ.
1995), affd, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). Then, close to home, the wrestling team




men's team budgets, larger rosters and even the addition of
new women's teams.3 Lately, those fears and hopes have been
coming true.
For a long time the fight over these words was small, and
the success of women and women's coaches in achieving gender
equity was minimal.4 However, starting in about 1992, women
began to win some important battles, and the level of fear in
male athletes, men's coaches and college athletic departments
began to increase dramatically. Recently, the battle over gen-
der equity and Title IX has taken some dramatic turns. Con-
gressional hearings have been held,5 and it is quite likely that
a Title IX case will make its way to the Supreme Court.
During the past ten years, my men's and women's teams
have not been significantly affected by the growing battle over
gender equity.6 However, clouds on the horizon suggest that
soon we may be affected. If the precedent set by the recent
decision in Cohen v. Brown University' is not modified, my
' The growth of women's teams has been dramatic of late. For example,
among many other additions, the University of Cincinnati added women's track in
the 1995-96 year, and Northern Illinois University added women's cross country
for the 1995-96 year.
Much of the delay in the successful use of Title IX was due to the holding
in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). The Court in Grove City held
that Title IX was program specific and applied only to those programs and depart-
ments within a university that directly received funds from the federal govern-
ment. However, Congress overturned Grove City with the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A) (1996). For a history of Title IX, see Diane
Heckman, Women and Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U.
MImii ENT. & SPORTS L. Rv. 1 (1992).
' On May 9, 1995, the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education,
Training, and Lifelong Learning held a hearing to investigate complaints that the
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights Enforcement was not properly
enforcing Title IX. See Ronald D. Mott, Congress Hears from All Sides on Title IX,
NCAA NEWS, May 10, 1995, at 1. While both supporters and detractors of the
existing three-prong test for compliance testified, the most publicized aspect of the
hearing was the call for clarification of the second and third prongs. As a result of
the hearing, the OCR was requested to issue and has issued a clarification of
prongs two and three. See Steve Wiedberg, House Panel Wants Better Enforcement
of Title IX Provisions, USA TODAY, May 26, 1995, at C8. The OCR presently is
reviewing comments on its first draft. of clarifications. See OCR Responds to Title
IX Compliance Confusion, NCAA NEvS, Oct. 2, 1995, at 1. Although much needed,
the clarifications do not add much to the understanding of Title IX jurisprudence.
6 To the extent that we have been affected, it has been positive. The women's
cross country team was created ten years ago, the year I took over the team. Dur-
ing all ten years the men's and women's budgets, both travel and scholarship,
have been equal.
' Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 95-2205, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30192 (1st Cir.
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men's team could be negatively affected.' Conversely, if the
Cohen holding is changed in some of the ways suggested by the
detractors of gender equity, my women's athletic team could be
negatively affected.9
The courtroom battles over Title IX, the legal force behind
the push for gender equity, have produced an interpretation of
Title IX and its implementing regulations that works much
like a blunt instrument, rather than a sharp knife, to go after
cancerous discrimination in college athletic programs. The re-
sult is a test which creates a conclusive presumption of dis-
crimination upon a showing of disparate impact; afi ative
defenses have been eliminated, and the plaintiff no longer
bears the ultimate burden of proving discrimination."0 At a
number of schools, the effect is that women and women s
teams are not being helped; rather, men and men's teams are
being hurt. Consequently, like overly aggressive cancer
treatments, healthy tissue is removed along with bad tissue,
and the patient receives no overall benefit. Therefore, there is
a need for a new and improved test for compliance with Title
IX that will leave both men's and women's teams positively
affected.
During ten years of coaching both men and women, I have
accumulated experiences that call into question some of the as-
sumptions that underlie current approaches to Title IX compli-
ance. Implicitly underlying many of the regulations and court
decisions interpreting and enforcing Title IX is the assumption
that given the same opportunities and encouragement, females
will participate in athletics at the same rate as males.' How-
ever, my experience does not support this assumption. In each
Nov. 21, 1996) [hereinater Cohen IV]; see infra pp. 1053-57.
" In the worst case scenario, the men's team would be eliminated in order to
balance out the participation numbers between men and women. In a less drastic
scenario, the team would be capped at nine or twelve members.
' Reforms in Title IX that would return collegiate athletics to pre-Title IX
days could result in budget cuts to, or even the elimination of, the women's team.
However, now that a constituency for certain women's teams exists, schools see
women's teams as a means of recruiting capable students. That is, smaller, private
schools like Valparaiso use nonrevenue sports, with little or no scholarship back-
ing, to recruit new students.
o See infra p. 1057.




of my ten years of coaching, despite coming from a student
body that is regularly more female than male (most recently
fifty-five percent female), more men consistently have turned
out to participate than women. 12 While broader social forces
may be at work, the encouragement and support for the wom-
en here appears to be equal.'3 Scholarships, travel budgets
and support services are the same for both sexes. Yet more
men than women choose to participate in athletics at the col-
lege level. This is not an experience limited to my school. It is
a national experience.'4
While discrimination at the high school and junior high
school levels 5 may be causing this effect at the college level,
the result is, nevertheless, that women are not taking advan-
tage of the opportunities to participate in athletics at the same
rate as men. A recent survey by the NCAA supports this con-
clusion.'" Therefore, the effort to implement Title IX must be
adjusted either to take this different level of interest into con-
sideration or to improve the interest level among women. Until
the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights Enforce-
12 In each of my ten years of coaching, the men's team has had four to ten
more team members than the women's team. This year (1996-97), I have thirteen
women and twenty-three men on the two teams.
13 It is possible that because I am a male, female athletes are deterred from
joining the team. However, on the average college women's cross country teams
are smaller than men's cross country teams. According to the NCAA, for the 1993-
94 academic year the average squad size for men's cross country teams was 13.5,
and for women's cross country teams the average size was 11.8. Participation
Numbers Narrowly Miss Record, NCAA NEWs, July 19, 1996, at 1, 13 [hereinafter
Participation Numbers].
14 Id.
1 According to the 1993-94 Handbook of the National Federation of State High
School Associations, in the 1992-93 school year, nationally 10,504 high schools
sponsored boys' cross country and 9741 high schools sponsored girls' cross country.
At those high schools, 159,536 boys and 116,221 girls participated. That works out
to an average squad size of 15.2 for boys and 11.9 for girls. In Indiana, 386 high
schools sponsored boys' cross country, and 339 high schools sponsored girls' cross
country. In those Indiana high schools, 5277 boys and 3546 girls participated. That
works out to an average team size of 13.7 boys and 10.4 girls. The fewer number
of schools that sponsor high school cross country nationally and in Indiana for
girls than boys may be contributing to the smaller squad size at the collegiate
level. However, the squad size difference that exists at the collegiate level also
exists at the high school level, supporting the observation that boys participate at
a higher rate. As yet, the reasons for that participation difference remain unan-
swered. Nevertheless, the difference in sponsorship is cause to press for compliance
with Title IX at the high school level.
"6 See Participation Numbers, supra note 13, at 1.
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ment ("OCR") and the courts recognize the group origin aspect
of the rights protected by Title IX, enforcement of Title IX will
continue to be problematic and uncertain.
The fact that women, by the time they reach college, show
a lower relative level of interest in athletics than men is in
little doubt. Before the age of twelve, girls and boys participate
at about the same rate in athletics. However, between the ages
of twelve and fourteen, girls begin to drop out of athletics at a
faster rate than boys.' Why this happens is hotly debated. Is
it something in society and the girl's environment that tells
her to get out of sports? Or, is it something in the girl's biologi-
cal make-up that tells her to get out of sports? This is nothing
but the old nature versus nurture debate. The evidence on both
sides of the debate leads me to conclude that nature and nur-
ture play symbiotic or complementary roles in driving girls
from sports. 8 If this is in fact true, then digging further into
i' See Donna Lopiano, Her Say, CHL TRIB. (Women Section), Dec. 26, 1993
(Donna Lopiano is the Executive Director of the Women's Sports Foundation);
Study Aims to Help Keep Girls Involved in Sports, VIDETIE-TIMFS, Aug. 13, 1995,
at B7 (report by Associated Press on study by Elizabeth Fielder and Sharon
Shields of Vanderbilt University).
"' The nature versus nurture debate about differences between men and women
cuts across many areas of the law. In the world of sports, particularly in my area
of cross country and track, there are many examples on both sides of the debate.
On the nature side is the effect that puberty has on girls' running abilities. In
many states each year at the high school cross country championships, a new
freshman "will come out of nowhere" to "shock" everyone by winning the event.
But two years later, when that freshman is a junior, she will be struggling to
qualify for the same state championship. The reason is that as a result of puberty
she is now twenty pounds heavier and sporting the body of a woman, not the
body of a girl It is euphemistically called the "black hole."
On the side of the argument that nurture drives girls from sports is the
stereotype of girls in sports. Girls that make the varsity team are rumored to be
at the least unfeminine or even lesbians. The members of the softball team don't
get dates; the cheerleaders get the dates.
The debate, interestingly, is not limited to the question of whether nature or
nurture drives girls away from athletics, but extends into whether athletics, be-
cause they are centered around competition, are destructive for women. In the
book No Contest: The Case Against Competition, Alfie Kohn argues that women, by
nature, prefer interdependence and relationship over competition with its emphasis
on winning. To be competitive, Kohn argues, is to deny desirable female qualities
and imitate men. Kohn writes: 'This is why I call the cheerleaders of competition
for women pseudofeminists: they are responding to sexism by appropriating the
worst of male values, which represents a serious error in judgment if not a kind
of betrayal." ALFIE KOHN, NO CONTES. THE CASE AGA NST COmp=ETI04 179
(1992).
Nevertheless, whether the cause of girls dropping out of sports is nature,
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the debate will not aid the search for a better Title IX test. The
test must work both to seek out discrimination in the environ-
ment and, at the same time, take into consideration the cause
of nature.
Finding or developing a new test and standard for compli-
ance with Title IX requires an understanding of the cui-rent
regulatory and case law interpretations and the implementa-
tion of Title IX. This law must be critiqued in light of the reali-
ties of college athletics. Such a critique should suggest a more
accurate test for gender equity. In Part I of this Article, the
current legal framework is explored. Here the "proportionality"
ruling of the Cohen III court is closely analyzed. In Part II, the
Cohen III court's interpretation of Title IX is scrutinized as if it
were before the Supreme Court. Finally, Part III offers a new
standard for compliance with Title IX that emphasizes the
group origin of Title IX athletic rights.
I. SUNmARY OF THE LAW
Many articles have been written about the history and
development of Title IX. 9 It would be a waste of time to re-
peat those authors' work. However, recent developments and
the need for an understanding of the relevant background calls
for a summary of the statutory, regulatory and case law that
embody Title IX. Further, a survey of the law is necessary to
address the one question that almost all of the courts and
nurture or both, something quite dramatic is happening to girls in their early
teenage years. For a dramatic account of this troubled time, see MARY PIPHER,
REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS (1994). After read-
ing Pipher's book, I am even more convinced that girls and young women need
sports to help them through their tough times, and therefore the emphasis of Title
IX enforcement must be aimed at junior high and high schools.
"' Among the articles that have tracked the development of Title IX are Walter
Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey Adeiman, A University's Defense to a Title IX Gender Equi-
ty in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student
Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 845 (1994); Diane Heckman, The Explo-
sion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining
the "Equal Opportunity Standard," 3 DET. C.L. REV. 953 (1994); Jennifer L.
Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 133 (1995); Janet Judge et al., Gender Equity in the
1990's: An Athletic Administrator's Survival Guide to Title IX and Gender Equity
Compliance, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 313 (1995); T. Jesse Wilde, Gender Equity
in Athletics: Coming of Age in the 90's, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 217 (1994).
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writers have neglected: Was Title IX intended to stimulate
participation by women, or was it intended to be merely a reac-
tive tool for protecting rights?
A. Statutory and Regulatory Summary
The operative language of Title DX can be found in 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681(a) and 1681(b). The relevant portion of Section
1681(a) reads: "No person in the United States shall on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
... 21 The relevant portion of Section 1681(b) reads:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpret-
ed to require any educational institution to grant preferential or
disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or per-
centage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the bene-
fits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, state, section, or other area....
The details of implementation and enforcement of Title IX
were delegated to the Department of Education ("DOE"),
which enacted implementing regulations in 1975.' Two por-
tions of the regulations specifically speak to athletics.' Sec-
tion 106.41 is the most important of the two and, in part,
reads:
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from
another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any inter-
scholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a
recipient ....
20 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1996).
21 Id. § 1681(a).
2 Id. § 1681(b).
Id. § 1682. In 1972, the agency responsible for promulgating the implement-
ing regulations was the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW"). In
1979, HEW was reorganized and the Department of Education was created to take
on some of HEW's functions, including enforcement of Title IX. From here on, I
shall refer to the Department of Education ("DOE") as the appropriate regulatory
agency. See id. § 3441.
4 34 C.F.R. § 106 et seq. (1996).
Id. § 106.37, 106.41.
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(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors inter-
scholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide
equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining
whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider,
among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of
both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice times;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or
sponsors separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this
section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to
provide necessary funds for teams of one sex in assessing equality of
opportunity for members of each sex.
In 1979, in order to provide more guidance, the DOE is-
sued a Policy Interpretation. 6 The policy statement is divided
into three sections dealing with athletic financial assistance,
equivalence in other athletic benefits and opportunities, and
effective accommodation of student interests and abilities. It is
the last section that contains the language that has become the
primary test for compliance with Title IX. That section, in
pertinent part, reads:
5. Application of the Policy - Levels of Competition.
In effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of male
and female athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity
for individuals of each sex to participate in intercollegiate competi-
tion and for athletes of each to have competitive team schedules
which equally reflect their abilities.
a. Compliance will be assessed in any one of the following
ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities
for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
26 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413-71,423 (1979).
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(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution
can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion
which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are under-represented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited above,
whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of
the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodat-
ed by the present program."
B. Case Law Summary
Armed with the text of Title IX and the above-described
regulatory material, four courts have analyzed the dictates of
Title IX. Those four cases, Cook v. Colgate University, Roberts
v. Colorado State Board Of Agriculture, Favia v. Indiana
University, and Cohen v. Brown University (Cohen Ii) have
been analyzed in many other articles and will only be summa-
rized here.' However, the fairly recent district court opinion
of Cohen III broke new ground and therefore will be carefully
analyzed here.
1. Pre-Cohen III (Cook, Roberts, Favia and Cohen)
Before Cohen III, with only one unimportant exception, the
courts have nominally adopted as a starting point in their
analysis the three-prong test for equal opportunity found in
the DOE's Policy Interpretation of 1979.' As drafted by the
DOE, the three-prong test allows a school to show compliance
with Title IX in any one of the three ways found in Sections
2Id. at 71,418.
See supra note 19.
See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v.
Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004
(1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cohen ];
Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1993). Cook, the first of these cases, is the exception and has not been fol-
lowed. The Cook court instead adopted the three-step burden shifting process ap-
plied in Title VII cases and conducted a sport to sport examination. Id. at 743.
Both of those approaches have been criticized. See T. Jesse Wilde, Gender Equity
in Athletics: Coming of Age in the 90's, 4 MARQ. SPoRTS L.I. 217 (1994).
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5(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the policy interpretation. The courts,
however, have turned the tests into a two-step burden shifting
proof scheme3 which may have altered the DOE's tests. To
prevail, a plaintiff must first show that a substantial difference
exists between the percentage of women in the student body
and the percentage of women participating in intercollegiate
athletics.31 In other words, the plaintiff must show that ath-
letic participation does not match the proportion of women in
the undergraduate population. Second, the plaintiff must show
that unmet interest exists; that the interests and abilities of
the underrepresented sex have not been fully and effectively
accommodated.32 After these two elements have been estab-
lished, the burden shifts to the defendant to show "a history
and continuing practice of program expansion which is demon-
strably responsive to the developing interests and abilities of
"' The burden shifting scheme was first used by the district court in Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 991 (D.R.I. 1992) [hereinafter Cohen 1].
31 In application, if the percentage of women in the student body is 55% and
the number of women that participate in athletics is below 55%, and if the differ-
ence is "substantial," then the plaintiff has satisfied the first element. Just what
constitutes a substantial difference has not been defined clearly. The Cohen H
court found a difference of 11.4% to be substantial. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 903
(citing Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991). The Roberts court found 10.5% to be sub-
stantial, Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; and the Favia trial court found a difference of
19.1% to be substantial. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584-85
(W.D. Pa. 1993).
While a "bright line" test for substantially proportionate participation has not
been established, the Roberts and Cohen H opinions can be read to create the
following test for substantial proportionality: If the change (improvement) in the
participation ratio of the underrepresented sex that would result from adding a
proposed sport (team) will tip the balance in favor of the underrepresented sex,
then substantial proportionality exists. Conversely, if the addition of a sport would
not tip the balance, then substantial proportionality does not exist. This reading of
Cohen II and Roberts rests on the courts' heavy reliance on the DOE's statement
that an exact match between enrollment and participation is the ideal situation,
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30; Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897-99, and on the courts'
emphasis on the concept of full and effective accommodation of the interests of the
underrepresented sex. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-30; Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897-99.
' When the plaintiffs represent a team that has been eliminated by the defen-
dant, the courts have said that the plaintiffs very easily satisfy their burden un-
der the second step. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831; Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 904. The
courts, however, have not faced the situation where the plaintiffs are asldng for
the creation of a new team.
[Vol. 62:1039
SEXUAL DISCRIMiATION IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
the members of the underrepresented gender."' This is the
second of the DOE's three tests. The Cohen II court views the
defendans burden as an affimative defense,' if met.
The plaintiff has the burden of going beyond proof of dis-
proportional participation (the first element of the plaintiffs
burden) since, according to the First Circuit, statistical evi-
dence alone is not enough to show discrimination. There must
be further evidence of discrimination, such as unmet interest
among the underrepresented sex.' Statistical evidence is not
enough because, under the three-part test of the DOE's Policy
Interpretation, an imbalance between enrollment and partici-
pation does not constitute a violation of Title IX if the school
has satisfied the interests and abilities of both sexes."' Within
this burden shifting scheme, a plaintiff does not have to prove
intent to discriminate,37 and a plaintiff may be awarded mon-
etary damages in addition to equitable relief.'
In evaluating the first element, proportionality, the courts
have declined to announce a precise test, instead choosing to
look at each case individually. So far, the lowest disparity to
fail the test of substantial proportionality has been 10.5%T
Similarly, when facing the third element, fully and effectively
accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex, the
courts also have not created a precise test. In all four of the
important Title IX cases, the plaintiffs represented women's
teams which were dropped from, or club teams denied, varsity
status. Under such circumstances, the courts stated that they
had little trouble finding unmet interest among the
underrepresented sex and thereby the second element of
plaintiffs' proofs.'
" Cohen H, 991 F.2d at 902 (quoting Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737,
743 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)).
' Id.
5 Id. at 895-96.
36 Id.
'7 Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832-33 (10th Cir.
1993).
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
See supra note 32.
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Although the four cases have left many questions unan-
swered,4 the courts rejected several of the defendants' argu-
ments and thereby defined some of what Title IX is not. First,
although the Cook v. Colgate University42 court seemed to
adopt the Title VII burden shifting scheme, the other courts
have expressly or impliedly rejected the Title VII scheme.43
Most commentators view the Cook decision as an aberration."
Second, the courts have rejected the argument that proportion-
ality is satisfied when a school participation ratio approximate-
ly matches the ratio of students interested and capable of par-
ticipating. In other words, they have rejected the argument
that if thirty percent of all the students interested in partici-
pating are women, then thirty percent of the participation
opportunities should be allotted to women.45 The courts reject-
ed this argument for two reasons. First, the courts found that
satisfying the relative interest of the underrepresented sex
would leave some interest among that sex unmet. This would
not satisfy the Policy Interpretation's requirement of full ac-
commodation even though interest among the overrepresented
sex remained unmet.46 Second, the courts found this interpre-
tation to ignore the history of institutional and societal favorit-
ism toward men which has in turn caused greater interest
"1 Among the unanswered questions is whether the unmet interest aspect of
the third prong of the DOE's three-prong test (and the second step in the courts'
burden shifting scheme) can be satisfied by a simple showing that members of the
underrepresented sex have a desire to participate in athletics rather than showing
an interest in a specific, but yet unsponsored, sport. This is a critical question in
situations where the number of sports sponsored for each sex is equal, but either
the nature of one sport (for example, football) or an imbalance in participation
(more men go out for cross country than women, for example) creates an imbal-
ance in participation opportunities under the first prong. Must the underrepre-
sented sex show interest in a yet unsponsored sport, or is a general interest
enough?
42 Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). In Cook, the plain-
tiffs, members of Colgate's Women's Club hockey team, alleged that Colgate's fail-
ure to elevate the club to varsity status violated Title IX. Applying a Title VII
proof scheme, the court concluded that Colgate discriminated against women by
sponsoring a men's hockey team but not a women's hockey team.
Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888, 901 (1st Cir. 1993).
" See Wilde, supra note 19.
5 See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir.
1993); Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899.
41 See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831; Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899.
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among men. Given equal opportunity and encouragement, the
courts believe, women will show an interest equal to that of
men.
47
Thus, the stage, as set going into the Cohen HI case, con-
tained the framework of a three-part burden shifting test
which was increasingly being read as accepting only propor-
tionality of participation as sufficient compliance with Title IX.
The second of the DOE's three tests, a history of expanding
opportunities, is at best a temporary answer. The third test,
full and effective accommodation of the underrepresented sex
even in the absence of proportionality, was on its way to elimi-
nation. Cohen III has now taken center stage and sent the
third test to the dressing room.
2. Cohen III
Cohen III has broken new ground because of the innova-
tive arguments made by the defendant, Brown University."
Brown University introduced statistical information and legal
arguments that forced a vigorous examination of the previous
interpretations of Title IX tests and standards.49 At the time
of trial, Brown University fielded sixteen men's teams and six-
teen women's teams,0 had a participation ratio of 38.13%
4 Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 890.
In a two to one decision, the First Circuit affimed Cohen 1I. Cohen IV, No.
95-2205, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30192 (1st Cir. 1996). The majority, relying heavi-
ly on the Law of the Case doctrine, rejected all of Brown University's attacks on
the reasoning of the Cohen III and Cohen II decisions. The dissent, however, found
that several exceptions to the Law of the Case doctrine applied and proceeded to
evaluate Brown's arguments. Most notably, the dissent found that contact sports
should be removed from participation comparison and that Brown's relative accom-
modation interpretation of the third prong of the policy interpretation three-part
test should be adopted. Id. Further, the dissent found that the proportionality test
created a quota which created an equal protection violation. Id. at 195.
"In addition to extensive evidence and expert testimony, Brown made sophis-
ticated statutory and regulation interpretation arguments. Many of these interpre-
tation arguments were previewed in a law review article. Connolly & Adelman,
supra note 19.
" Of these sixteen teams, thirteen women's and twelve men's teams were fund-
ed by the university, and three women's and four men's teams were "donor-fund-
ed. All of the teams, regardless of funding source, were designated as varsity
sports. However, the court found that the donor-funded teams did not offer partici-
pation opportunities equal to that of the varsity funded teams. Sce Cohen III, 879
F. Supp. 185, 188-89 (D.R.I. 1995).
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women and 61.87% men, and had an undergraduate enroll-
ment ratio of 51.14% women and 48.86% men. The named
plaintiffs were members of the women's gymnastics and vol-
leyball teams, which had been cut from varsity status along
with the men's water polo and golf teams. The plaintiffs repre-
sented the class of "all present and future Brown University
women students and potential students who participate, and/or
are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics
funded by Brown."51
The arguments and analysis were limited to the issue of
whether Brown effectively accommodated "the interests and
abilities of students to the extent necessary to provide equal
opportunity in the selection of sports and levels of competition
available to members of both sexes."52 To show that it had
effectively accommodated female athletes, Brown focused its
arguments on the first and third prongs of the three-prong test
adopted from the DOE's Policy Interpretation. The essence of
Brown's argument was that, as currently applied by the courts,
the three-prong test does not accurately measure participation
opportunities and the relative interests of both sexes."3 At the
heart of this argument was the premise that women have not
shown the same level of interest in participating in athletics as
men.' The court rejected Brown's arguments on all points.
On the first prong, the test of substantial proportionality,
Brown first argued that "participation opportunities" should be
defined as the maximum number of members that a team
could accommodate or at least as many as the comparable
men's team size.55 The court found these measurements to be
predetermined by the defendant and problematic. Instead, it
opted for a count of the team rosters at the end of the season
as the measure of participation opportunities.56
Failing on this point, Brown offered an alternative test for
providing proportionate participation opportunities. According
to Brown, opportunities must be offered in proportion to the
ratio of interest among the student body. Therefore, if forty
51 Id.
52 Id. at 193 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417 (1979)).
5' Id. at 200.
54 Id. at 209-10.
Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 203-04.
I5 d.
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percent of the students that show an interest in participation
are women, forty percent of the participation opportunities
should be available for women. This argument borrowed heavi-
ly from Title VII jurisprudence, which tests employment dis-
crimination by comparing the qualified applicant pool with
work place demographics."
In rejecting this argument, the court relied heavily on the
conclusion that student interest cannot be accurately measured
and the observation that, unlike the gender neutral job classifi-
cation at issue in Title VII cases, Title IX cases involve gender
requirements. According to the court, the first problem is find-
ing the appropriate pool to survey. The court rejected a pool
consisting of matriculated students, because that group is
predetermined by recruiting practices.S Actual applicants to
the school will not work for the same reason as matriculated
students; they preselect themselves based on the sports offered
by Brown. Further, a mere expression of interest does not
always grow into participation.59 The only pool that the court
was willing to accept was "all academically able potential var-
sity [high school] participants." However, conducting a survey
of that pool of high school students is practically impossible.'
Besides problems in selecting a pool to survey, the court
found that relying on a survey to test compliance will not mea-
sure latent and changing interests"' or take into account how
opportunity can drive interest.' Further, on an administra-
tive level schools will find it difficult to survey continually the
chosen pool and respond to those changes.'
Brown's next line of defense was to define full and effec-
tive accommodation, the third prong, as satisfaction of interest
in proportion to the interest among each sex 4 According to
the argument, a school will fully and effectively accommodate
both sexes if it provides participation opportunities in propor-
tion to the interest of both sexes. Or, defined negatively, the
' Id. at 205.
" Id. at 206.
' Id. at 206-07.
Cohen HI, 879 F. Supp. at 207.






school disappoints each sex in proportion to its demonstrated
interest." Because this argument is similar to and rests upon
some of the same presumptions as Brown's argument on pro-
portionality, it was rejected by the court.' In addition to the
problems of assessing interest, the court noted that Brown's
proposal would work to lock in the status quo, a status quo
created by past discrimination. ' Any survey of interests
would reflect current interests and not promote the develop-
ment of new interests.' The court interpreted Title IX to be
remedial, to correct past discrimination. Brown's test would
not stimulate interest because opportunity creates interest.69
Thus, the court found that Brown had failed to provide
female athletes with equal opportunity to participate in inter-
collegiate athletics. In rendering its decision, unlike past deci-
sions, the court explicitly and impliedly clarified and refined
the test for compliance with Title IX. Until Cohen III, the pos-
sibility existed that a university could use survey data to show
that it was fully and effectively accommodating the interest of
the underrepresented sex, satisfying the third prong. Now,
however, this avenue has been closed by the court's conclusion
that any survey will be flawed, and that the use of such survey
data will defeat the remedial intent of Title IX. The practical
effect, whether intended or not, is to leave the first prong,
proportionality, as the only test for compliance with Title IX.
The third prong is now no more than an element of proof in
the plaintiff's case: namely, requiring the plaintiff to show
unmet interest.
However, one district court has declined to adopt and
apply the three-part test found in the Policy Interpretation. In
Pederson v. Louisiana State University,"° the court rejected
the proportionality foundation of the three-part test for two
reasons. First, the court found that the Policy Interpretation
did not have the force of law because it had not been adopted
by the President or Congress7 and was in conflict with the
Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 208.
Id. at 210.
G7 Id. at 209.
c Id.
CgId.
70 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
7' Id. at 910.
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Regulations. Specifically, the court found Section 1681(a) to
prohibit an interpretation of Title IX to require preferential or
disparate treatment to members of one sex, which the court
believed proportionality to do.7" Second, the court rejected the
Roberts, Cohen and Homer courts' adoption of proportionality
as lacking evidentiary support. According to the Pederson
court, those three courts relied on the assumption that interest
to participate in sports is equal between men and women. The
Pederson court found no evidence in the Roberts, Cohen or
Homer opinions to support that assumption." Therefore, the
Pederson court analyzed the accommodation of interest ques-
tion without the aid of the proportionality starting point.
The questions now become, did the Cohen III and IV
courts stray from what Congress and the DOE intended? And,
is the effect of this holding to change Title IX from a measure
to prevent discrimination into a means of creating interest and
participation, or as some critics have asserted, a requirement
of affirmative action?74 To answer these questions, it is neces-
sary to analyze Title IX the way that the Supreme Court
might.
I. INTERPRETATION OF TITLE IX
Most scholars agree that the Supreme Court has employed
or does employ two methods of statutory interpretation: the
modern textualist and the intentionalist approaches." The
modern textualist approach appears to be favored by the ma-
jority of the current Court.76 Generally, the modern textualist
approach can be described as a search for how an ordinary per-
son would understand the law as written, without the aid of
72 Id. at 914.
'13 Id. at 913.
7' See Stephen Chapman, Unsportsmanlike Conduct- Setting Quotas for Women
in College Sports Isn't Fair Play, CHL TRIB., Apr. 20, 1995, at 21.
1 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 20 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95
COLUm L. REV. 749 (1995). Other terms have also been used to describe what is
essentially intentionalism and textualism by some commentators.
76 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualisr and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355 (1994); Pierce, supra note 75, at 750.
1996]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
extratextual sources. On the other hand, the intentionalist
approach seeks the underlying purpose or intent of the drafters
and will resort to extratextual aids in some circumstances.
A. A Modern Textualist Interpretation
Modern textualists, led by Justice Scalia, eschew reference
to legislative history, reasoning that legislative history is noth-
ing more than the contrived statements of only a few special
interests and therefore not indicative of the prevailing intent of
Congress.77 Discovery of the prevailing intent of Congress
therefore being impossible, modern textualists instead seek the
plain meaning of the words chosen by Congress. As Justice
Scalia wrote:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined,
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been un-
derstood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather
on the basis of which meaning is . .. most in accord with context
and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood
by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute
78
Should the language of a statute be ambiguous, the modern
textualist will look to contemporaneous and contextual aids to
find the ordinary meaning of the words chosen. These aids
include dictionaries, other similar statutes and common law
usage.9
The first step, then, in determining whether proportionali-
ty, as the only method of complying with Title IX, is in accord
with the language of Title IX is to look for contextual clues.
Within the text of Title IX, three provisions facially appear to
speak to a test for compliance:
Section 1681(a): No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity... ;
" See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759 (1988); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988); United Say. Ass'n
of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
78 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S, 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
"9 See Pierce, supra note 75, at 750.
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Section 1681(a)(8): This section shall not preclude father-son or
mother-daughter activities at an educational institution, but if such
activities are provided for students of one sex, opportunities for
reasonably comparable activities shall be provided for students of
the other sex;
Section 1681(b): Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section
shall be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant
preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or re-
ceiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity,
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex in any community, State, section, or other area: Prouided,
That this subsection shall not be construed to prevent the consider-
ation in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical
evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect
to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such pro-
gram or activity by the members of one sexm'
Now, do the dictates of any of these three provisions show
an unambiguous expression of congressional intent? That ques-
tion is the first step in determining whether an agency's con-
struction of a statute passes muster.8' If an unambiguous ex-
pression of congressional intent is found, the analysis stops
there.' Here, it cannot be said that Congress expressly autho-
rized or forbade proportionality. However, it can be said that
Congress intended institutions to provide "reasonably compara-
ble opportunities." A close reading of Sections 1681(a) and
1681(a)(8) leads to that conclusion. Section 1681(a)(8) requires
that when -one sex is provided with an opportunity, the other
sex must be provided with a "reasonably comparable opportu-
nity." Section 1681(a)(8)'s requirement thereby puts into effect
the command of Section 1681(a) that no person be excluded
from participation or be subject to discrimination on the basis
of sex.
But there remain two unanswered questions: (1) how do
we determine when one sex is being afforded an opportunity
that the other sex is not being afforded, and (2) what is a "rea-
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1996).
', Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1983).
92 Id at 842-43.
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sonably comparable opportunity." Section 1681(b) helps in
answering the first question, but only a little. Section 1681(b)
tells us that unequal opportunity does not exist when an im-
balance in sex is caused by an imbalance in the sex of the sur-
rounding geographic area. Then it tells us that a statistical
imbalance may nevertheless be used to show unequal opportu-
nity in other circumstances. The question of proportionality re-
mains unanswered. We must therefore look elsewhere for guid-
ance.
Textualist practice would suggest that the dictionary defi-
nition of terms should be consulted next. Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary defines "reasonable" as "not extreme or
excessive; moderate, fair."' "Comparable" is defined as "capa-
ble of or suitable for comparison; equivalent, similar .... ))84
Moreover, Webster's defines "opportunity" as "a favorable junc-
ture of circumstances; a good chance for advancement or prog-
ress ... ."' Read together, Webster's definitions of "reason-
able," "comparable" and "opportunity" suggest a fair chance for
a similar experience. It does not suggest a guarantee, but the
option to take advantage of an offer. Proportionality, on the
other hand, does involve a guarantee. The number of partici-
pants is locked in. Therefore, using Webster's definitions as a
guide leads to the conclusion that the plain meaning of Title IX
does not include proportionality. But, ironically, while
Mellinkoffs Dictionary of American Legal Usage does not have
entries for "comparable" and "opportunity," it states that "rea-
sonable has no precise legal meaning."8 Other evidence of the
meaning of "reasonably," "comparable," and "opportunity"
would certainly help.
Textualists will consult statutes with similar or the same
words or phrasing for guidance. 7 In the case of Title IX, such
consultation is particularly appropriate because Title IX was
patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." In
8' WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 981 (9th ed. 1993).
": Id. at 267.
' Id. at 828.
56 MELLiNKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 539 (1992).
'7 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988); Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1988).
" See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.
1993).
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fact, except for the group being protected, the first sections of
Title IX and Title VI are identical. Therefore, what Title VI
was thought to mean in 1972, when Title IX was enacted, is
strong evidence of the plain meaning of the words used in Title
IX.
While by 1972 several circuits had accepted disparate im-
pact as evidence of violation of Title VI, the Supreme Court did
not pass on the question until 1974.' Until 1974, it was un-
certain whether a disparate impact, in the absence of inten-
tional discrimination, violated Title VI. Therefore, the under-
standing of Title VI as of 1972 does not conclusively include or
exclude proportionality, even if proportionality is viewed as
akin to proof of discrimination by disparate impact. However,
if the reasoning found in Justice White's opinion in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission is allowed to have a
retroactive effect,"0 Congress can be said to have intended or
allowed disparate impact proof of Title IX violations." To
reach this conclusion, one must accept the Guardians Coures
conclusion that Congress permits disparate impact proof when
the agency's regulations allow it, and then one must couple the
Guardians Court's conclusion with the fact that the disparate
impact regulations of Title VI existed when Title IX was en-
acted. This reasoning, however, seems tenuous and is weak-
ened by the limited support that Justice White's reasoning
received in Guardians and the likelihood that the current
Court, led by Justice Scalia, would decline to follow Justice
The Supreme Court first addressed and allowed disparate impact evidence as
proof of a violation of Title VI in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). However,
the Court more fully discussed disparate impact proof in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER
LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LLUIUTY § 8:22, at 70
(1996).
' Justice White found that disparate impact proof of a Title VI violation is
permitted when applicable agency regulations permit disparate impact proof.
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591.
,1 In Guardians, the Court faced the question of whether proof in a private
Title VI case required a showing of intent to discriminate. The plaintiffs, African-
Americans hired after their white coworkers because of discriminatory practices,
challenged the defendant's last hired-first fired policy as disproportionally affecting
them. Five justices found that disparate impact, without a showing of intent, was
sufficient when the applicable implementing regulations employed an effects stan-
dard. However, seven of the Justices found that intent was necessary in the ab-
sence of "effects" regulations to win a private Title VI claim. Id. at 582.
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White's reasoning. Further, it is not the Title IX regulations
that contain the proportionality requirements; it is the DOE's
policy interpretation. A policy statement does not carry the
force of law that regulations carry and therefore may fall out-
side of, or at least weaken, the Guardians rule as applied to
Title IX. Congress did not review the policy statement as it
reviews regulations. Additionally, the three-prong test found in
the policy statement does not use the language of disparate im-
pact. It is the courts that have altered the three-prong test.
Congress has not yet spoken on the proportionality-only test.
In summary, a textualist interpretation of Title IX would
likely lead to the conclusion that proportionality, as defined
and applied by the Cohen III decision, does not fall within the
plain meaning of Title IX. The plain meaning of Title IX is
that no person, because of his or her gender, can be denied the
opportunity to participate in collegiate athletics. It does not
mean that an imbalance in participation in athletics is conclu-
sive proof of discrimination, nor does it mean that interest in
participation must be created by universities. It only means
that a woman cannot be excluded because she is a woman.
A textualist reading of Title IX is not the only reading that
is possible, however. An intentionalist reading may conclude
that proportionality is within the intent of Congress or that
the intent of Congress is not clear, and resort to the interpreta-
tion of the agency charged with implementing Title IX is neces-
sary.92 It is equally feasible that the Supreme Court could
employ a combined textualist and intentionalist approach to
interpreting Title IX.
B. Intentionalist Interpretation
A thorough analysis of Title IX and proportionality must
include what some label as an intentionalist interpretation.
The intentionalist interpretation method seeks the underlying
purpose or intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.9 3
While the majority view of the intentionalist method seeks the
Under the Chevron process, if the intent of Congress is not clear, then any
permissible construction of the agency is accepted. See Chevron U.SA. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
" See Aleinikoff, supra note 75, at 23-24.
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purpose or intent of Congress as of the date of enactment,
some intentionalist interpretations seek the dynamic intent of
the legislature.' In finding the dynamic intent of the legisla-
ture, courts look for the concerns that the legislature intended
to address."
An intentionalist interpretation begins with a review of
the text of the statute, but quite readily consults evidence of
legislative history to discover the legislative purpose. Among
the many sources of legislative history, the Supreme Court
primarily uses committee reports, floor debates and hearings
in that order." The appropriateness of using legislative histo-
ry, even aside from the textualist-intentionalist debate, has
been widely debated. Court practice has varied from only con-
sulting legislative history when the statute is found to be am-
biguous, to the other extreme of consulting legislative history
to confirm an otherwise clear statuteY Here legislative histo-
ry will be consulted without any preconceived notions as to its
use.
The legislative history of Title IX on the subject of college
athletics (or athletics in general) is rather limited. No com-
mittee reports were issued on Title IX, and athletics were
mentioned only twice during the congressional debates."3 Fur-
ther, both times that athletics were discussed, the discussion
had little or no bearing on the test for compliance with Title
IX.2 The only significant legislative history was created when
Congress held hearings on the regulations proposed by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare."' In response
See Aleinikoff, supra note 75, at 46-48.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 75, at 22-24.
S3 A survey of Supreme Court references to legislative history in its opinions
from 1938 to 1979 revealed that about 50% of the references were to committee
reports, about 20% were to floor debates, and about 15% were to hearings. See
Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Leg-
islative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURB=CS J. 294, 304 (1982).
Patricia M Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39
AT. U. L. REV. 277, 287-90 (1990).
, Cohen H, 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993).
In the first reference to athletics during the congressional debate over Title
IX, Senator Bayh spoke to the question of gender-blended football teams. 117
CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971). The second reference, again by Senator Bayh, addressed
the matter of privacy in athletic facilities. 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
" The Department of Health, Education and Welfare submitted its regulations
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to those proposed regulations, Senator Tower offered an
amendment that would have exempted all college athletics
from Title IX coverage."o' Although later modified to exempt
only revenue producing sports, the Tower Amendment was
dropped by the committee and replaced by the Javits Amend-
ment.0 2 The reason for the change and the intent of the
Javits Amendment are not explained. The Javits Amendment,
in its operative part, reads that regulations should be prepared
"which shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic ac-
tivities reasonable provisions considering the nature of the
particular sports."0 '
An analysis of the legislative history that speaks specifi-
cally to athletics reveals only the general intent of Congress.
The rejection, at least by implication, of the Tower Amendment
demonstrates that Congress intended Title IX to cover all ath-
letics, revenue producing and nonrevenue producing alike. Just
how the Javits Amendment refines this general intent is less
than certain. The DOE has interpreted the amendment to
mean no more than that sports that require more equipment
and have higher injury rates may be budgeted relatively more
money.0 4 Despite the arguments of some schools, the DOE
has rejected interpretations that would lead to the exclusion of
football.'05
More guidance can be found in the history of Title IX that
shows an intent to repeat the workings of Title VI. As the
Supreme Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, Title
to implement Title IX to Congress for review pursuant to § 431(d)(1) of the Gener-
al Education Provisions Act. Sex Discrimination Regulations, 1975: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975).
.01 After the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education failed to disap-
prove the proposed regulations to implement Title IX, Senator Tower introduced a
bill which called for the exemption of all college athletics from the coverage of
Title IX. The Senate Subcommittee on Education held hearings on the bill, during
which the bill was modified to exempt only revenue producing sports. The bill
failed due to lack of action. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,473 (1979).
" See Sex Discrimination Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 21 (1975).
103 Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612
(1974).
'o, Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415-71,416 (1979).
10' Id. at 71,421.
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IX was explicitly patterned after Title VI, and the drafters of
Title IX assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as
Title VI had been during the preceding eight years. ' There-
fore, what Title VI was in 1972 is what Title IX was intended
to be. The tests and standards that existed for Title VI in 1972
are the tests and standards that Congress intended to be ap-
plied to Title IX in athletics.
As of 1972, proof of discrimination by a disparate impact
method had not been conclusively accepted by the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court."°7 There was disagreement
between the circuits as to whether Title VI required a showing
of intentional discrimination or if a disparate impact showing
was sufficient. Therefore, as was discussed in more detail earli-
er under the textualist interpretation, Congress cannot be said
with certainty to have intended a disparate impact showing for
proof of a violation of Title XI in 1972. ' As a result, a static
intentionalist interpretation of Title IX would likely reach the
same result as a textualist interpretation of Title XI: An ab-
sence of proportionality, without a further showing of intent to
discriminate, was not intended by Congress to be proof of vio-
lation of Title IX. However, a dynamic intentionalist interpre-
tation of Title IX could reach the opposite conclusion.
A dynamic intentionalist interpretation begins with a
search for the concerns that Congress intended to address in a
particular statute. According to the Supreme Court in Cannon,
Congress sought to achieve two objectives when it enacted
Title VI and, therefore, by implication, Title IX. First, Congress
intended to prohibit the use of federal funds to support dis-
criminatory practices. Second, it intended to protect individuals
against discriminatory practices." 9 After determining
Congress' concerns, a dynamic intentionalist interpretation
asks whether the conduct in question furthers, in a reasonable
fashion, those concerns.
This question, whether the proportionality test furthers
the goals of eviscerating gender based discrimination in the
use of federal funds in collegiate athletics, is the core question
10 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
10 See infra pp. 1062-63.
10 See infra pp. 1062-63.
1 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
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that the courts will ultimately have to answer. So far, the
courts have not fully examined this question. Rather, they
have deferred to agency interpretations, a procedural analysis,
and have not faced the substantive, hard question. To face this
question head on, the first necessary step is defining what
constitutes discrimination. While the attempt to define dis-
crimination may seem naive, a simple definition will work to
determine whether the proportionality test furthers Congress'
goals for Title IX.
Discrimination, in one of its simplest definitions, is the
denying or awarding of a benefit because the recipient possess-
es or does not possess a characteristic unrelated to the qualifi-
cation necessary to receive the benefit. The classic example is a
person being denied the right to vote, a right one qualifies for
by virtue of citizenship, because of the characteristic of race. In
other words, this test for discrimination is a two-step process.
First, the accepted criteria for receiving a benefit is determined
(i.e., age eighteen and United States citizenship to vote). Sec-
ond, if additional criteria or requirements exist which are ap-
plied to only a portion of the potential recipients, discrimina-
tion has occurred.
The proportionality test, as applied by the Cohen III court,
defines as unacceptable the criteria of gender to participate in
college athletics. At that level of definition, the proportionality
test furthers the congressional objective of prohibiting the use
of federal funds to support discriminatory practices. Further,
considering that Congress has had at least one opportunity to
reject the proportionality test,"0 it can be said that Congress
considers the proportionality test to be consistent with the goal
of prohibiting the use of federal funds to support sex discrimi-
nation in college athletics. Therefore, it is quite likely that a
dynamic intentionalist interpretation of Title IX would find
that the proportionality test fits within the intent of Congress
when it enacted Title IX. However, the same reasoning could
result in a finding that the elimination of men's sports in order
to achieve proportionality violates Title IX. The elimination of
men's sports in some respects adds an impermissible require-
ment to participate in college athletics: not being male.'1 '
11 See supra note 5.
... See Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill.
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In conclusion, if the Supreme Court sets out to determine
whether the Cohen II court's proportionality test is an accept-
able interpretation of Title IX, the outcome will depend on
whether the Court employs a textualist approach, a static
intentionalist approach or a dynamic intentionalist approach to
statutory construction. Under the textualist and static
intentionalist approaches, the likely conclusion is that the pro-
portionality test exceeds the intent of Congress. However, if
the dynamic intentionalist approach is used, the conclusion
could be that the proportionality test falls within the intent of
Congress.
Contradictory outcomes, dictated by the method of inter-
pretation, are hardly a desirable state of affairs. They harm
the legitimacy of the conclusion. But the fault for the contra-
dictory conclusion should not be laid at the feet of the method
of interpretation used, it should be laid at the feet of the inter-
pretation being offered. An interpretation truer to the intent of
Title IX would satisfy all three methods of interpretation. Such
an interpretation is the subject of the next section of this Arti-
cle.
III. NEW STANDARDS
The DOE's three-part test and its interpretation by the
courts will continue to cause confusion and some injustice until
the test is reformed to recognize the feature of gender equity in
athletics that separates it from all other anti discrimination ef-
forts. That feature is the group nature of the "right." Unlike
anti discrimination laws such as Title VII where the discrimi-
nation is committed against an individual, in Title IX settings
the discrimination is committed against either all members of
a sex or a distinct grouping of members from one sex: e.g., all
women on a campus who desire to play basketball."'
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995), for an
example of this requirement.
1 These "group rights" occur when the issue is whether a school is equitably
sponsoring sports for both sexes. The "group rights? concept does not apply to




To illustrate this point, consider the situation in which
women are clearly the underrepresented sex in athletic partic-
ipation at State University, and one woman comes forward to
demand the creation of a crew team. Under the current regula-
tions and case law, not to mention the reality of all athletic
programs, State University has no obligation to sponsor a
women's crew team unless other women, enough to field a
team at State University and to create teams at competitor
schools, also step forward.113 In this way, one woman's inter-
est in a crew team does not create a "right" to a crew team;
only a sufficiently large group of women can create a "right" to
a crew team.'14
The proportionality test, even when coupled with the re-
quirement of showing sufficient interest in a particular sport,
fails to reflect and honor the group nature of the right to par-
ticipate in college athletics. For example, by using the current
student body as a baseline for judging how many athletes from
each sex should be permitted to compete, the size of the group
that creates the right is not considered, and thereby rights
that are out of proportion to the group's size are created. The
percentages of each sex in the student body do not necessarily
reflect the size or inclination of the group that is interested in
college athletics. An example of the absurd extreme that
proves the point can be created out of college basketball's
"March Madness." Assume that the ratio of men to women at
State University is forty-five percent to fifty-five percent re-
spectively. Under the current proportionality test, that ratio
should result in forty-five percent of the athletes being men.
Further, assume that the vast majority of men on State
113 For example, the Policy Interpretation excuses a school from sponsoring a
team when there is no reasonable expectation of competition within the school's
normal competitive region. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979); see Roberts v. Colo-
rado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1993).
14 During this discussion, it must always be remembered that there is no con-
stitutional right to participate in college athletics. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F.
Supp. 989, 994 (S.D. Iowa 1993). There is no property right or protected expec-
tation of participation. However, once a school decides to offer athletics, it must
offer it equitably to both sexes. In this way, participation in athletics is a privi-
lege that an individual earns by meeting minimum academic standards (the NCAA
and institutions set the standard) and athletic standards established by the coach.
While the group may acquire a "right" when the school offers athletics, the indi-
vidual must earn the privilege.
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University's campus desire to play only basketball, and not
other sports. Then assume that the women on State
University's campus enjoy a broad selection of sports. In this
hypothetical, the forty-five percent figure is not reflective of
the group of men on campus who desire to participate in ath-
letics. The men's interest justifies fielding only a basketball
team. State University would be unfairly spending money on
men to field more than a basketball team." And, under the
current proportionality test, State University would only have
to field a women's basketball team, despite a strong interest in
other sports among the female student body.
This line of analysis admittedly rests on the assumption
that it is unfair or inequitable to grant one sex more "privileg-
es" than that sex, as a whole, has asked for. Or, to phrase it
differently, it is unfair and inequitable to deny a privilege to
one sex at a greater relative rate. In quantitative terms, this
assumption of equitable disappointment can be demonstrated
in the following way. Assume that State University offers one
hundred team positions for women and one hundred team
positions for men. Then, assume that consistently over the
years, 400 women vie for the available one hundred positions
and 200 men vie for their available one hundred positions. The
result is an inequitable allocation of the available team posi-
tions to women relative to the demand among women.
The proportionality test also fails to ensure equitable op-
portunity to participate in college athletics because it wrongly
assumes that the group rights that are protected by Title IX
emanate from the group comprised of all men on campus. Ac-
tually, the rights that are protected by Title IX emanate from
the group defined as all men on campus who have the desire
and ability to compete in college athletics1 1 -- a subset of all
11 The uniqueness of gender equity in college athletics among "civil rightsw
issues and the fallacy of using generalization like the proportionality standard can
be seen in this example. This example also raises the specter of where athletics in
the United States could be headed if the NCAA does not support the "minor"
sports.
"I This definition of the protected group is also seen in the third part of the
DOE's test. That third part recognizes that participation cannot exceed interest.
The test reads:
Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercolle-
giate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of
program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demon-
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men on campus. Therefore, the baseline group to measure
whether adequate opportunities are being offered by a school
should be changed to reflect the true nature of rights involved.
Including within the definition of a baseline group the
desire or interest to engage in a particular activity is not a
novel idea. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,"' the Seventh Circuit stated that the
analysis of statistical evidence is not complete if circumstantial
variables are not included in the analysis. In Sears, the EEOC
claimed that Sears was systematically denying women the
opportunity to fill commission sales positions. As proof of this
discrimination, the EEOC introduced statistical evidence which
focused on the low number of women in commission sales posi-
tions and the high number of women in noncommission sales
positions. In responding to this evidence, Sears introduced evi-
dence showing that, despite Sears's efforts to recruit women,
women were not interested in commission selling. Among the
reasons for this lack of interest was a dislike for the cutthroat
competition and increased risk of commission sales compared
to non-commission sales. The Seventh Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's judgment for Sears, pointing out that the district
court reasonably considered the lack of interest among women
in commission sales positions when evaluating the plaintiffs
statistical evidence."' In discussing its analysis, the Seventh
Circuit quoted the Supreme Court, stating that "[statistics are
not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any
other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circum-
stances.""'
The proportionality test is the use of statistical evidence
without the consideration of surrounding facts and circum-
stances. The probative weight and assumptions underlying the
strated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
n 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
n Id. at 314, 327.
'1' International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340
(1977).
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statistical evidence of proportionality should be open to chal-
lenge just as the statistical evidence in Sears was open to chal-
lenge.
The current test, based on proportionality, will also contin-
ue to create confusion and injustice because it sets a moving
target which changes the test from year to year. First, as en-
rollment changes from year to year, the baseline for determin-
ing how many members from each sex must be participating in
athletics will change. In a worst case scenario, this would
mean that a school would be adding and dropping teams each
year as the enrollment changed. But that problem is com-
pounded by the second problem with the current proportionali-
ty test. By measuring actual participation, rather than oppor-
tunity to participate, the measure of proportionality can be
easily changed by changes in team size. Nonscholarship teams
particularly (and partial scholarship teams) can change size
from year to year by as much as thirty percent for reasons
unrelated to conscious efforts by the coach to increase or de-
crease team size."
The logical conclusion of these observations is that a new
test, truer to the goals of Title IX, is needed. Such a new test
should have two parts: first, new safe harbors by which schools
can judge their compliance; and second, a refinement of the
burden shiing scheme for litigation under Title IX. A safe
harbor, as used by the courts, is a standard that when met,
creates an almost conclusive presumption of compliance. Both
of the tests should be centered around a true measure of the
group from which the right to participate arises.
However, the tests must also be effective in achieving
other necessarily related goals. The tests must be true to forc-
ing a change in the status quo which favors men in spending
and opportunities. But the tests must also not swing the pen-
dulum too far in favor of women. That will only lead to a back-
lash and prolong the battle to find an equitable test for gender
equity. The tests must also be flexible enough to accommodate
changes in the popularity of particular sports.
' The size of my men's cross country team has changed from one year to the
next by as many as twelve. In 1995, the team had twelve members; in 1996, the
team was twenty-four strong.
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But the most important criteria that the new test must
meet is its ability to work in the hardest cases. Too many ob-
servers of gender equity problems feel that more money is the
answer. While that may be true at the big Division I schools
that have the ability to raise more money, it is not as viable a
solution for many small schools. At the smaller schools, the pie
cannot be significantly increased. The test must therefore work
to divide a limited pie equitably.
A. New Safe Harbors
Schools need a bright line standard by which they can test
compliance. However, the factually sensitive nature of each
school's situation necessitates a menu of safe harbors. Three
choices appear to embody the objectives of Title IX and its
group rights nature:
(1) The starting positions on varsity teams available to
men and women are almost equal;
(2) The opportunity available to each sex matches the na-
tional high school participation rates of each sex;
(3) The opportunity available to each sex matches the high
school participation rates for each sex in the state in which the
school is located.
1. Equal Starting Positions
Equalizing the number of starting positions available to
both sexes is the least responsive of the three safe harbors to
the concept of a group created right, but it is the method that
best serves as a stimulus to increasing interest among women,
an objective that some courts have said underlies Title IX. But
equalizing starting positions does allow the greater interest of
one sex in athletics to be satisfied, to a certain extent, by not
capping team size. For example, while both a women's and a
men's cross country team would have seven starting positions,
each team would be allowed to carry as many team members
as university resources permit.
The obvious fear in this measure is that schools will fund
men's teams at high levels to cover and encourage more men's
participation. This cheating of the safe harbor would be natu-
rally limited by the budget stretching that funding teams with
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equal starting positions would demand and the regulations
that currently require equitable support services between the
sexes.
122
The negative effect of this safe harbor for men's teams is
the effect that football will have on nonrevenue teams. Theo-
retically, football has twenty-four to twenty-six starting posi-
tions. Rather than adding two to four teams which create
twenty-four starting positions for women, a school may decide
to cut two to four men's "minor" sports to create the balance in
starting positions. Unfortunately, this is a very real possibility
considering the power of football on most campuses. 2 But
this is a possibility caused by the same forces that shape the
group rights of women to participate in sports. Men, and soci-
ety as a whole, choose to participate in and support football at
a higher rate than men and society participate in and support
tennis and volleyball, however disappointing this result may
be. Only the NCAA, by requiring a minimum number of sports,
can prevent a menu of sports that includes only football and
basketball on the men's side and basketball, volleyball and two
other sports on the women's side.
2. High School Participation Rates-Choices (2) & (3)
Virtually every sport at the college level is also played at
the high school level. If a sport is not played at the high school
level in the geographic area around a school, the sport likely
cannot survive. In some situations, club teams may spring up
before high schools sponsor teams, as was true of soccer, for
example, but the lag time in moving from club to varsity status
usually is not long. Therefore, high school participation is a
good indicator of the level of interest in society and among the
potentially college bound population. It is true that discrimina-
tion occurs at the high school level. However, high schools are
in a better position to respond to and stimulate interest in
athletics. The high school and junior high school years are the
formative years in which athletic interests and abilities are
21See supra note 23 and the accompanying text
At the Division 1A football schools, football is either a revenue producer or
so strongly supported by alumni that it will withstand most kinds of cutbacks.
Even at schools like Valparaiso where football is a very large or the largest part
of the athletic department's budget, football has survived many attacks.
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most shaped. Once a student arrives on a college campus, he or
she has made the basic decision of whether or not to partici-
pate in athletics in general and which sport to participate in
specifically. In ten years of coaching, I have never had a per-
son, male or female, join the team who did not compete in
athletics in high school, and only one male and one female who
did not compete in cross country or track in high school. It is
very difficult and unrealistic to start a team at the college level
that is not widely sponsored by area high schools or an exten-
sive club system.
Using national statistics will be a true measure for schools
with a national draw. National statistics may also prevent
schools from relying on state statistics that reflect a long lag
time in recognizing a growth in interest, either overall or in a
particular sport. However, in some cases state statistics may
be more telling of interest, particularly when the school draws
a large majority of its students from the state or region in
which it sits. State or regional statistics will also be the best
test for regional trends and developing interests.
While using high school statistics will provide some cer-
tainty, perhaps the most beneficial effect will be the focus that
will be drawn to discrimination at the high school level. Top-
down stimulation of interest and participation in all but the
television sports, sports that are easily packaged and hyped
like basketball and football, is a losing effort. Teams created at
the college level that do not have counterparts at the high
school level will be unable to sustain themselves and will not
inspire twelve-year olds to take up the sport. Only television,
to a lesser extent the print media, and "grass roots" opportuni-
ties will get a twelve-year old involved in a sport or sports in
general. That is why, for the non-television sports, sponsorship
at the high school level is vital to generating the critical mass
of interest and participation necessary to sustain college
teams. Therefore, the efforts to enforce Title IX at the high
school level are the most effective to creating participation.
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B. A New Burden Shifting Scheme
Even when a school sets anchor in a safe harbor, discrimi-
nation can occur. These safe harbors, because they rest on
generalizations,"= must only be presumptions of compliance,
not conclusions of compliance. School must continually monitor
indications of group interest, and plaintiffs must be able to
show that their group rights are nevertheless being violated.
However, the current burden shifting scheme must be modified
to create a true test for discrimination against a group's rights.
That scheme must be within the plaintiffs reach to prove
while still being true to the requirement that the ultimate
burden of proving discrimination rests with the plaintiff.
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff would have to
show that one of the safe harbors is not being met, that he or
she is a member of the underrepresented sex, and that suffi-
cient interest exists on campus to field a team. After a prima
facie case is established, the burden would then shift to the
defendant to rebut the prima facie case in one of two ways: (1)
by showing that it meets one of the other safe harbor tests and
that safe harbor is a more accurate indication of compliance
than the plaintiffs choice of safe harbors,14 or (2) by showing
that despite the existence of sufficient interest on campus,
insufficient interest exists at potential competitor schools and
among the region's high schools or club programs to assemble
a schedule and sustain a team. If the defendant can rebut the
prima facie case, the burden would then shift back to the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant intentionally discriminat-
ed against the group that the plaintiff represents.
While admitting that the safe harbors are based on generalities admits a
possible flaw, the generalities of these safe harbors are more indicative of reality
than the generality on which the proportionality safe harbor is based.
" Proof that one safe harbor is more telling than another safe harbor must
necessarily rest on a showing of undermeasuring interest. The target safe harbor
must be shown to underestimate the strength of interest of the group on campus




While Title IX has brought about necessary changes in
college athletics, it has work yet to do. However, the current
interpretation of Title IX that employs the proportionality test
fails to recognize the group origin of Title IX athletic rights
and, thereby, is beginning to cause unnecessary harm. The
proportionality test rests on the assumption that women are
interested in athletics to the same degree as men upon enter-
ing college. However, experience does not support this assump-
tion.
If Title IX is to create interest in athletics among women,
the battle must be waged in middle and high schools. Those
years are the critical period to stimulate interest in athletics
for both boys and girls. By enforcing proportionality at the
college level, the courts are forcing colleges to turn men away
from college athletics and to search for women to compete on
college teams. In all ten years of coaching, I have had to plead
with women to join the team in order to field a sufficiently
large team. I have never had to plead with men. Proportion-
ality, if it is obtainable, cannot be required of colleges until
proportionality is a reality in the high schools. College teams
require a high school feeder system.
Therefore, a new Title IX test must be developed. The test
must use as its baseline high school participation statistics.
College sports are a reflection of the wider society and its in-
terests. If girls vote in high school to drop out of sports, they
cannot be pulled back, in most instances, into sports in college.
Title IX jurisprudence must honor those votes.
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